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The degree to which different social groups get along is a key indicator of the cohesiveness of 
a society. This study examines perceptions of social cohesion amongst Europeans and 
explains variations in those perceptions by considering the separate and combined effects of 
economic strain and institutional trust. Analyses were conducted with the 27 member 
countries of the EU based on the Eurobarometer 74.1 on poverty and social exclusion 
conducted in 2010. Results show that individuals living in households experiencing economic 
strain perceive social cohesion to be weaker than their less economically hard-pressed 
counterparts. By contrast, individuals trusting their political institutions perceived there to be 
higher levels of cohesion. Furthermore, institutional trust substantially moderates the negative 
relationship between economic strain and perceptions of cohesion. These results are robust to 
various model specifications. Moreover, extending the analysis revealed that this moderating 
effect held when considering social relations between the poor and rich and between different 
racial and ethnic groups. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Concerns about social cohesion within and across the member states of the European Union 
(EU) have been a defining feature of the recent history of the union (Klingemann & Weldon, 
2012; Novy, Swiatek & Moulaert 2012). As the effects of globalization and transition to a 
post-Fordist economy have gathered pace, the pursuit of social cohesion has become central 
to the project of European integration (Faludi 2007). The European debates about cohesion 
initially focused on territorial inequalities in the European space, especially in terms of access 
to public services following market liberalization (Héritier 2001). In the wake of the Lisbon 
agenda, attempts to reconcile the contradictions between the economic and social logics 
within the European project have been supplemented with an interest in the quality of social 
relations within Europe’s cities and regions (Council of Europe 2007). Indeed, as the EU has 
continued to expand, so too has interest in the strength of the social bonds within its borders. 
The recent Eastern enlargements and the potential accession of Turkey, have in combination 
with the impact of the global financial crisis and the subsequent troubles of the Eurozone, 
arguably placed more pressure on the relations between the social groupings within Europe 
countries than at any time in the post-war period (European Commission 2011).  
The economic crisis has lead to a reemergence of social tensions, at least in public 
debate if not always in reality, between rich and poor, social classes, young and old and 
different ethnic groups. High youth unemployment has generated resentment among the 
young about the wealth and pensions of the old and fuelled discussions about the affordability 
of the current welfare state arrangements. Mass dismissals and frequent strikes have re-
emphasized social class struggles, and classic tensions between rich and poor have found a 
new vocabulary in slogans such as ‘we are the 1 per cent’. With unemployment in many EU 
countries at record levels, it seems likely that the goal of a more cohesive Europe has been 
seriously threatened by the increased strain on household finances in most countries. In fact, 
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news stories from across the continent point towards the flaring of social tensions as 
unemployment soars and governments make cuts to the public sector. The relationship 
between economic strain and perceived social cohesion within European countries is therefore 
a timely and pertinent subject for empirical investigation. Yet, despite the high political 
visibility and salience of the issue, little attention has been devoted to exploring what shapes 
Europeans’ perceptions of the relations between different social groups.  
To date, rather than seek to capture the quality of inter-group relations, quantitative 
research has tended to use indicators of generalized trust as a proxy for social cohesion (e.g. 
Delhey 2007; Vergolini 2011). Thus, despite the extensive academic and policy debates about 
social cohesion in Europe (see Novy, Swiatek & Moulaert 2012), scant research has 
systematically explored the determinants of Europeans’ perceptions of how well different 
social groups get along (though see Green, Janmaat & Cheng 2011; and Whelan and Maitre, 
2005). Furthermore, little is known about the boundary conditions of the relationship between 
economic strain and social cohesion, especially the role that trust in national political 
institutions might play in influencing that relationship. Institutional trust is a key indicator of 
democratic health, and is an important predictor of positive social attitudes, including respect 
for, and tolerance of, social heterogeneity (Boeckmann & Tyler, 2002). As such, it seems 
logical to suppose that citizens who trust their political institutions will be better able to 
weather the centrifugal social forces associated with economic strain. 
This paper uses multivariate statistical techniques to explore the independent and 
combined effects of economic strain and institutional trust on Europeans’ perceptions of the 
relations between the major social groupings within their country. The paper begins by 
discussing theories of social cohesion, before hypotheses on the relationships between 
economic strain, institutional trust and perceptions of social cohesion are developed. The data 
and methods for our analysis are then identified and described, before the results of our 
statistical modeling are presented, and theoretical and practical implications explored. 
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Theoretical background 
Social cohesion is often regarded as a political term or ‘catchword’, which can be utilized and 
mobilized by policy-makers to capture a certain sense of idealized togetherness within society 
(Bernard 1999). In this respect, the on-going debates about social cohesion in Europe 
represent a political response to the impact of macro-economic and societal trends over which 
political actors have comparatively little control. Yet, the ideas and concepts that lie behind 
these debates about the cohesiveness of European societies are of considerable theoretical 
interest and pedigree. Indeed, social science has long contained wide-ranging discussions 
about the causes and consequences of variations in social cohesion (e.g. Durkheim 1984; 
Putnam 2000; Tonnies 1955).  
Broadly speaking, social scientists regard communities and societies as cohesive when 
aggregate level conditions ‘are producing positive membership attitudes and behaviours’ 
(Friedkin 2004: 410). In this respect, social cohesion can be conceptualised as a latent 
construct that cannot be directly observed, but rather is composed of separate though inter-
related objective and subjective dimensions that are susceptible to observation. There is now a 
growing literature focused on the definition and measurement of the different dimensions of 
social cohesion (see especially Berger-Schmitt 2000; Chan, To & Chan 2006; Dickes & 
Velentova 2012). Many scholars suggest that this work reflects two broad approaches to 
understanding social cohesion. One focused on the shared norms and values that bind people 
within a community together and another focused on the actual quality of the social relations 
between those people (Delhey 2007); though, such relations may of course be the product 
rather than an indicator of cohesiveness.  
Several author(s) have striven to bring together the norms and relational-based 
approaches to social cohesion in the analytical frameworks that they develop (e.g. Chan, To & 
Chan 2006; Kearns & Forrest 2000). However, in this paper, we do not seek to offer an all-
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encompassing evaluation of the effects of economic strain on the multiple dimensions and 
indicators of social cohesion identified in the theoretical and methodological literature. 
Rather, we concentrate our attention on a relational approach to understanding perceptions of 
social cohesion since this approach encapsulates the concerns with the relations between 
different social groups, which are currently at the heart of debates about the cohesiveness of 
European societies. Thus, we do not explore what might shape the existence of a shared set of 
values that binds together Europeans from different countries or whether perceptions of 
economic strain influence the propensity of people to engage in positive pro-social activities. 
Instead, we aim to empirically examine the determinants of one particular aspect of social 
cohesion that has so far been under-studied: the perceived degree of tension between different 
social groups. This means we approach the concept at the micro-level of interactions between 
individuals and groups, and not as a characteristic of an aggregate social unit, such as a 
neighbourhood, region or country. 
The extent to which diverse social groups are able to harmoniously co-exist is an 
indicator of social cohesion with a venerable heritage. In particular, social disorganization 
theories have long regarded inter-group relations as a measure of the capacity of a community 
to sustain itself in the long-term (e.g. Kornhauser 1978; Shaw & McKay 1969). Where 
tensions between social groups become embedded within the structure of a community, 
people arguably become progressively less able to realise their common aims and values, such 
as long-term health, family stability and social order (Kornhauser 1978). In fact, such tensions 
can become so deeply entrenched within a society that they create a vicious cycle of negative 
feedback effects (Markowitz, Bellair, Liska & Liu 2001; Steenbeck & Hipp 2011). The 
experience of economic strain is potentially an important contributor to those negative effects. 
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Economic strain and social cohesion 
The economic strain experienced by individuals is a measure of how difficult those people 
find it to live on their current income (Whelan et al., 2001). As such, people’s subjective 
assessment of their economic situation may not correspond very well with their actual income 
or standard of living. For example, the “squeezed middle” may feel, rightly or wrongly, that 
they are under greater economic pressure than their working class neighbours (Scott & 
Pressman 2011). However accurate an individual’s perception of economic strain, that 
viewpoint will likely influence their cognitive functioning, and potentially shape their 
attitudes towards the society in which they live. Reference group theory highlights that the 
propensity of individuals to compare their own situation with that of others means that the 
experience of economic strain can generate psychological effects akin to those associated with 
actual poverty and hardship (Runcimann 1966). Aside from potential reductions in cognitive 
capacity (Mani et al, 2013), economically stressed people may feel that their difficulties 
restrict their opportunity to attain the kind of place within the social structure to which they 
aspire. Disenchantment with their own lot can then lead individuals to experience “sour 
grapes” when they observe others doing better than they are (Elster 1983; Hedstrom 2005). In 
such circumstances, it is quite conceivable that the anxiety caused by economic strain will 
give rise to a sense of social fragmentation, that everyone within society is not “all in it 
together”, and that some individuals and groups are gaining at the expense of others.  
Reference group theory suggests that the negative comparisons individuals make 
between their own fate and that of others often gives rise to out-group hostility, which 
problematizes the development of the shared goals and values that underpin harmonious 
social living (Merton 1957). Given the connection between the economic opportunity 
structure and people’s well-being in developed societies (Hagerty 1998), a disjuncture 
between economic aspirations and actual outcomes may be especially likely to prompt 
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feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment, particularly towards outgroups. Moreover, although 
the experience of economic strain and grinding poverty are not equivalent, there are several 
other ways in which the effects of strain might mimic those of actual hardship. In addition to 
potentially experiencing feelings of alienation and hostility, individuals suffering economic 
strain may lack the capacity and willingness to contribute to the resolution of collective action 
problems. For example, they may not feel able or willing to invest the time or money required 
to participate in the kinds of civil associations that build connections between diverse social 
groups (Smith 1994). They may also find it more difficult to develop the varied social 
networks and supportive social relationships required to overcome out-group hostility and 
build cohesive societies (Putnam 2007). Thus, on the basis of the disjoint between aspirations 
and reality, and the potential constraint on social participation posed by the experience of 
economic hardship, we expect that: 
 
H1: Economic strain will be negatively related to perceptions of social cohesion 
 
Institutional trust and social cohesion 
Within European societies, the economy is not the only social structure that shapes 
individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and actions (Oskamp & Schultz 2004). The political institutions 
present within any given society too have a major impact on individuals’ experience of their 
place within that society when compared to their fellow citizens. According to civic-
republican theories, where individuals trust their political institutions it is highly likely that 
they have come to share some basic common political values and moral principles that 
undergird their attitudes towards their fellow citizens (Putnam, 1993). Or put differently, a 
high level of institutional trust is an excellent indicator of the extent to which the citizens 
within any given country embrace a common civic culture (Almond & Verba 1963; Letki 
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2006). At the same time, in the presence of such a civic culture, people generally become 
more able to articulate, support and enact common goals, and place greater trust in public 
authorities’ ability to be responsive to their needs and demands (Almond & Verba 1963). This 
greater engagement with and involvement in the political opportunity structure is therefore 
likely to be associated with several additional positive externalities, including higher levels of 
resilience to the perceived social threats posed by immigration and ethnic diversity (Andrews 
2009; Putnam 2007). 
For many social scientists, institutional trust and the strength of the civic culture are so 
closely related to the cohesiveness of a society as to be virtually inseparable. Indeed, a 
number of previous studies have drawn upon institutional trust as one amongst a battery of 
social cohesion indicators (e.g. Dickes & Velentova 2012; Green, Janmaat & Cheng 2011; 
Vergolini 2011). However, in the burgeoning empirical literature on this topic, little attention 
is given to the interrelationships between the different dimensions of social cohesion, so in 
seeking to explore the benefits of institutional trust for tensions between social groups we aim 
to break new conceptual and empirical ground. For instance, in the related literature on social 
capital, several studies examine the ways in which its different dimensions are connected (e.g. 
participation in membership organizations and political participation (e.g. Van der Meer and 
Van Ingen, 2009, Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008)). All the same, trust in political institutions 
is not only an individual-level indicator of broader social attitudes, but is also a reflection of 
individuals’ beliefs about the responsiveness of institutions to their preferences and priorities 
(Scharpf 1999). Thus, as noted above, we anticipate that institutional trust will exhibit a 
distinctive and important relationship with perceptions of social conflict within European 
societies that is not simply attributable to its being a product of the cohesiveness of a given 
society. 
If individuals place a great deal of trust in their political institutions, it is likely that 
they will have a higher level of trust in their fellow citizens (see Brehm & Rahn 1997). Faith 
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in political institutions induces trustworthy behaviour (Irwin 2009), serving as the repository 
of the ‘meta-trust’ throughout society that undergirds citizens’ confidence that social and 
political conflicts can be successfully resolved. Where institutions are trusted, extending trust 
to others becomes easier because there is a guarantee that violators of this trust will be 
penalized. Once individuals trust institutions such as courts, police, or other institutions tasked 
with settling disputes and regulating society, they can afford to take the risk to trust others, 
safe in the knowledge that people will be penalised for behaving in an untrustworthy manner. 
When there is high institutional trust, citizens believe that they can rely on institutions to 
solve problems. In particular, they are likely to believe institutions will be capable of 
resolving disagreements between different groups that would otherwise create important 
social tensions. In addition, high institutional trust makes it easier for government to develop 
and deliver policies because it lowers the transaction costs associated with “selling” policies 
to citizens and securing their compliance (Cook, Hardin & Levi 2005; Fukuyama 1995). 
As a result of the close connection between trust in government and positive attitudes 
towards fellow citizens from diverse social groupings identified in several previous studies, 
we therefore anticipate that: 
 
H2: Institutional trust will be positively related to perceptions of social cohesion 
 
Economic strain, institutional trust and social cohesion 
In addition to having a direct positive connection with perceptions of social cohesion, 
institutional trust is also likely to influence the impact that other salient variables might have 
on people’s perceptions of tensions between different social groups. Where individuals 
generally trust political institutions to govern in ways that advance their own interests in a fair 
and just manner, they may feel less inclined to react negatively when they compare 
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themselves unfavourably to other reference groups (Sztopmka 1999). Put simply, institutional 
trust may outweigh the propensity for a person’s failure to achieve the standard of living to 
which they aspire to result in their feeling alienated from society or feeling hostile towards 
other social groups. Individuals experiencing severe economic strain who trust the political 
institutions in their country may therefore feel that the political opportunity structure is one in 
which their life aspirations and chances are still valued. 
In essence then, trustworthy political institutions inspire a positive sense of common 
citizenship that can transcend the experience of economic inequality (Marshall 1992). Thus, 
the experience of common purpose and political equality might potentially buffer Europeans 
from some of the most corrosive effects of economic strain. Whether by imparting a sense of 
common citizenship that assures individuals that their interests are treated equally or by 
prompting people to be more proactive in contributing to the public good (Cook, Hardin & 
Levi 2005; Hardin 1991; Irwin 2009), institutional trust may hold the key to overcoming 
barriers to positive social relations. Hence, our final hypothesis is that: 
 
H3: Institutional trust will moderate the negative relationship between economic 
strain and perceptions of social cohesion 
 
Data and method 
For our analysis we use data from the Eurobarometer project, a comparative large-N survey 
conducted twice a year since 1973. On behalf of the European Commission, Eurobarometers 
are coordinated by a consortium formed by Taylor Nelson Sofres and EOS Gallup Europe. 
Respondents are selected following a multi‐stage, random probability sampling procedure 
from the total population aged fifteen and above. Interviews are then conducted face to face at 
the respondent’s home. To ensure cross-country comparability of survey items, questionnaires 
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are carefully designed, translated and back‐checked (see GESIS, 2013). For our study we 
utilize Eurobarometer 74.1 on poverty and social exclusion in the EU27 member countries 
(European Commission 2010). The survey work was fielded between August and September 
2010. Its sample population is representative at the national level with a total of 26,635 
respondents – approximately 1,000 respondents per country.
1
 Data has been weighted in 
proportion to its share in the total population of the 27 member countries of the EU. These 
adjustments are based on EUROSTAT population figures and include post-stratification 
sample weighting factors. 
 
Dependent variable 
We measure social cohesion as an attitudinal phenomenon reflecting individuals’ perceptions 
of the quality of the relationships between different social groups (see Moody & White 2003). 
Contrary to much prior research on social cohesion which uses neighborhood- or regional-
level indicators, we concentrate on social cohesion as the (perception of) micro-level 
interactions between individuals and groups, and do not approach it as a macro-level attribute. 
We use subjective indicators for two reasons. One is that social cohesion is a fairly broad 
concept that would require a wide range of indicators to capture, some of which may even be 
incommensurable. Secondly, citizens do not necessarily perceive low social cohesion, even 
when objective indicators suggest this is the case (see Han, Janmaat, Hoskins and Green, 
2012). Individuals’ behaviors and actions depend as much on how a social situation is 
perceived, as the picture presented in official statistics. Thus, we operationalize social 
cohesion as a low degree of perceived social tensions among various socio-economic groups, 
including the poor and the rich (wealth), managers and workers (social class), old and young 
people (age), and different racial and ethnic groups (ethnicity). Within the Eurobarometer 
survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they perceive tensions between those 
social groups. More precisely they were asked: “In all countries there sometimes exists 
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tension between social groups. In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of 
the following groups in (YOUR COUNTRY)?”. Answer possibilities ranged between ‘A lot of 
tensions’ (1), ‘Some tensions’ (2), and ‘No tensions’ (3). We assume, the lower the degree of 
tensions between indicated groups are, the higher the perceived social cohesiveness of a given 
country. 
There are substantial differences between European countries in the degree to which 
tensions are perceived between social groups (see table 1). Perceived tensions are generally 
high in Hungary, the Czech Republic, France, Slovenia, and to some extent in Greece and 
Germany. Perceptions of social cohesion are quite positive in Denmark, Finland, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Portugal. Within certain countries, there are some remarkable differences between 
the four types of tensions. Danish and Dutch respondents, for instance, generally perceive low 
tensions between groups, and especially between rich and poor, but they do perceive high 
ethnic tensions. Some other countries such as Lithuania and Romania perceive high socio-
economic tensions, yet do not see a lot of ethnic tensions. In Latvia and Romania, perceived 
tensions between rich and poor tend to be much higher than tensions between other groups. 
Finally, in the UK, Estonia and Poland, overall tensions are comparable, and in these three 
countries, tensions between young and old are comparatively less important.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Because social cohesion is generally regarded as a latent construct, we constructed a 
measure of all four foci of tensions between social groups using principal components 
analysis, as displayed in table 2. Due to the ordinal nature of our four social cohesion items, 
we used a polychoric correlation matrix to obtain the dependent variable (see Holgado-Tello 
et al. 2010). All four items loaded on a single factor and further tests on their internal 
reliability revealed an underlying latent concept of social cohesion (as exemplified by a 
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Cronbach’s alpha of 0.70). Our extracted factor revealed an Eigenvalue of 2.39, explaining 
60% of the total variance. Moreover, we tested whether our revealed factor structure is 
supported within each country by means of a confirmatory factor analysis, finding acceptable 
fit values.
2
  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Independent variables 
Since there are substantial cross-country differences in levels of income and the cost of living 
across the EU, it is necessary to draw upon an indicator that is able to capture the relative 
economic strain experienced by individuals in Europe. Reference group theory indicates that 
people regularly assess their economic situation by comparing their standing with that of 
relevant others (Runciman 1966). It is possible that such comparisons may occur across EU 
member countries as well as within them, and may be used to generate comparatively accurate 
assessments of the relative economic strain experienced by individuals. Respondents to 
Eurobarometer 74.1 were asked to indicate on a six point Likert scale how comfortable they 
felt against the background of their total household income. Specifically, they were asked: “A 
household may have different sources of income and more than one household member may 
contribute to it. Thinking of your household’s total monthly income, is your household able to 
make ends meet…?”. Answer possibilities ranged from ‘Very easy’ to ‘With great difficulty’. 
Measures of this type have been used in several prior studies of economic strain (e.g. 
Blekesaune 2013; Vergolini 2011; Whelan, Layte, Maitre & Nolan 2001; 2005).  
Individuals’ confidence in their political authorities to observe the rules of the game 
and serve the common interest varies strongly within and across European member countries 
(Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van de Walle et al. 2008). In particular, individuals have 
varying beliefs about the extent to which the political institutions within their country are 
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responsive to their preferences. We aim to capture these subjective judgments about 
institutional responsiveness by looking at the degree to which European citizens trust the 
major political institutions within their countries. More specifically, to gauge institutional 
trust respondents to the Eurobarometer 74.1 were asked to indicate on a ten point Likert scale 
“Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the following institutions using a scale 
from 1 to 10 where [1] means ‘you do not trust the institution at all’ and [10] means ’you 
trust it completely’”. At which point, they were prompted regarding the following political 
institutions: 1) the national parliament, and 2) the national government. A composite indicator 
of institutional trust was constructed by taking the average score of these two items 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93). 
 
Control variables 
We introduce a range of potential control variables that may influence the relationships we 
study, beginning with wealth, employment status, age, and country of origin. Respondents’ 
wealth status is measured by asking them to indicate on a 10 point Likert scale, ranging from 
very poor to very wealthy, where they would situate the economic situation of their 
household. Including this measure of income in our model enables us to parse out the 
reference group effects of economic strain from those simply associated with lower household 
resources. As regards employment status, respondents were asked to indicate their current 
occupation. We grouped them into seven categories: managers and professionals, clerical 
workers, self-employed, working class, unemployed and not in the labor force. In terms of age 
we have grouped respondents into four age groups, namely 15-24 years, 25-39 years, 40-54 
years, and 55 years and older. Whenever respondents had a different nationality from the 
country where he/she currently lived in we coded them as immigrants.  
Additional controls include respondents' gender and the type of community 
respondents are living in (rural town, small or medium town, large town). Controlling for 
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educational status, we grouped respondents according to their age when they left fulltime 
education. Those who have indicated that they had no formal education or exited the 
educational system at the age of 15 or younger were regarded as having completed only basic 
or no formal education whatsoever. Those between 16 and 19 years were categorized as 
having finished secondary and those older than 20 as finished higher education. Respondents 
who were still studying were assigned to one of the three categories in correspondence to their 
age. 
  
[Table 3 about here] 
  
Results 
We first present the results of the multivariate regression models using perceptions of social 
cohesion as a latent construct. Subsequently, separate models are run for each of the aspects 
of social cohesion. As a first step, we estimate two Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
models as depicted in table 4. In the first model, we include all our control variables, in the 
second we then add economic strain. In a third model we include institutional trust and the 
final model (model 4) also incorporates an interaction term between strain and trust.
3
 The base 
terms were mean centred before we entered them into our models, to further reduce the 
potential for multicollinearity to bias the estimates (Aiken & West 1991). We estimate our 
models using country unit fixed-effects to account for potential clustering effects and 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
17 
 
The results for the baseline model suggest that wealthy individuals, immigrants, 
women and the young and the elderly perceive fewer social tensions, whilst individuals of 
lower socio-economic status, the unemployed and others not in the labour force perceive there 
to be more social tensions. The size of the community in which respondents live and 
educational attainment are all unrelated to perceptions of cohesion.
4
 Of particular interest here 
are the positive relationships between being a woman or being an immigrant and perceptions 
of social cohesion. It is generally assumed that men feel more integrated within European 
societies than women, especially through their participation in the labour market. 
Nevertheless, prior cross-European studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship 
between gender and both social and institutional trust (e.g. Green, Janmaat and Cheng, 2011; 
van Oorschot and Arts, 2005), highlighting that much more research on this topic is necessary 
to underpin any firm conclusions about the relationship between gender and perceptions of 
social tension.  
In a similar vein, although individuals belonging to a national outgroup might be 
thought likely prima facie to have a less positive outlook on group relations within a given 
country, it is possible that they actually have a much more optimistic view of their host 
country. Theories of segmented assimilation suggest that first-generation immigrants may 
perceive fewer social tensions because they are less familiar with the inter-group dynamics of 
a given country than second-generation immigrants or native-born residents. They may also 
have lower expectations about their place within the system of social stratification (Zhou, 
1997). Although little research has assessed the relationship between immigrant status and 
perceptions of group tensions, some prior work has examined the link between that status and 
generalized and institutional trust. One study of cross-European attitudes using the 2002 
European Social Survey (ESS) finds that immigrants exhibit lower levels of interpersonal 
trust than native-born individuals (Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle and Trappers, 2009), but others 
exploring the relationship with institutional trust find, as we do, the opposite relationship (e.g. 
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Röder and Mühlau, 2012, which uses ESS data from 2002, 2004 and 2006). Longitudinal 
studies exploring the precise dynamics of immigration and social cohesion in European 
societies would undoubtedly be of great theoretical and practical value. 
In terms of the main independent variables of interest, we can observe that the higher a 
respondent’s economic strain, the lower his/her perceptions of social cohesion. This finding 
seems to confirm the insights of reference group theory regarding the likelihood that 
individuals experiencing economic difficulty may feel greater resentment towards those in 
other social groups coupled with reduced ability or willingness to contribute to collective 
action to resolve social tensions. Moreover, the substantive effect of economic strain is large. 
In figure 1, we first graph the predicted values for the effect of economic strain on perceptions 
of social cohesion as estimated in our first regression model shown in table 4. We observe that 
a standard deviation (SD) increase of one in economic strain results in a .08 decrease in the 
social cohesion scale. The graph depicting this effect illustrates that the confidence intervals 
do not overlap at any point across the range of predicted probabilities. Thus, we can conclude 
that economic strain has a substantive and statistically significant effect at all points. 
For institutional trust, as expected, the effect direction points in the opposite direction. 
More trust in institutions is associated with a higher level of perceived social cohesion. 
Hence, our findings offer support for the civic-republican argument that citizens who regard 
themselves as members of a political community in which they are valued tend to view 
relations between the different groups in that community more positively. The effect size for 
trust is quite large. We also observe that a one SD increase in institutional trust is associated 
with a 0.2 increase in the measure of social cohesion. Moreover, in the second graph depicted 
in figure 1 we find very little overlapping of the 95% confidence interval of the predicted 
values of social cohesion for different levels of institutional trust. Respondents that experience 
high levels of trust are reporting significantly higher levels of perceived social cohesion.  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We now turn our attention to evaluating the potential interaction between economic 
strain and trust in institutions. We assume that the negative effect of strain on perceptions of 
social cohesion will decrease as trust in institutions increases. Thus we expect trust in 
institutions to have a moderating effect on the economic strain-social cohesion relationship. 
Adding the interacted term to our model increases the explanatory power, indicating that the 
propensity of individuals experiencing economic strain to trust their political institutions may 
play an important role in explaining social tensions. From table 4 we can observe that the sign 
of the coefficient of the interacted term is positive as expected and is statistically significant. 
This offers support for our hypothesis regarding the interaction between economic strain and 
institutional trust. However, to disentangle the substantive impact of trust on the strain-
cohesion relationship, this interactive effect requires further investigation. In this vein we 
follow Brambor, Clark & Golder’s (2006) suggestion for calculating the marginal effects of 
the independent variable (economic strain) on the dependent variable (perceived social 
cohesion), contingent on the potential moderator (trust in institutions), as visualized in figure 
2. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Looking at figure 2, an interesting picture emerges. Higher levels of institutional trust 
do seem to lower the negative marginal effects of Europeans’ economic strain on social 
cohesion. Or in other words, as trust in institutions increases it mitigates the negative 
relationship between economic strain and the perceived prevalence of social tensions within 
European societies. From the figure, we find that the observed effect is substantive, as the 
95% confidence intervals do not overlap largely. Furthermore, we can see that the upper 95% 
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confidence interval hits the zero line after the trust in institutions scale reaches ‘6’, about one 
standard deviation above the mean level of trust. This indicates that high levels of trust have 
the potential to wipe out the negative marginal effect of strain on perceived social cohesion; 
though it is important to note that very high levels of institutional trust do not turn the 
negative effect of economic strain positive. The graph therefore highlights that Europeans 
experiencing economic difficulties who also exhibit a high level of trust are less likely to 
negatively perceive social cohesion within their country. Practically speaking, this suggests 
that trustworthy political institutions can support social cohesion, even when the economic 
strain experienced by citizens is high. To further elaborate on our main findings shown in 
Table 4 and figures 1 and 2, we model the tensions between each of the different social 
groups incorporated within our social cohesion construct. 
 
Modelling the relationships for different sources of social tension 
Generally speaking, social cohesion is conceptualised as a kind of latent construct that cannot 
be directly observed, but rather is composed of separate though inter-related aspects that are 
susceptible to observation. Nevertheless, although taken together those separate aspects of 
cohesion may constitute a theoretically coherent representation of an underlying concept, each 
aspect may itself have an independent life of its own. To provide additional insights on what 
drives public perceptions of social cohesion, we therefore estimate models for each aspect of 
social cohesion, namely the presence or absence of tensions in terms of wealth, social class, 
age and ethnicity. In re-estimating our models for these different aspects of social cohesion 
we anticipate that the effects we observe will be broadly similar to those for the composite 
measures. However, we anticipate that the moderating effect of institutional trust on the 
strain-cohesion relationship may matter most for the tensions between the wealthy and the 
poor, since prima facie those tensions are most likely to be impacted by economic strain. By 
contrast, we anticipate that tensions between management and workers may be the most 
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impervious to the moderating effect of institutional trust due to the persistence and resilience 
of class divisions within many European societies (Breen, 2004).   
For our extended analysis, the dependent variables are ordinal, ranging from ‘1’, over 
‘2’, to ‘3’. A commonly used estimation strategy would therefore be to perform an ordinal 
logistic regression (OLR). However, one major prerequisite to acquire unbiased estimates in 
an OLR setting is the proportional odds assumption, which assumes identical slope 
coefficients for each cut point of single logit functions. Unfortunately, all specifications of our 
empirical models violated this assumption. To address this issue we employ a Stereotype 
Logistic Regression (SLR) (Andersen 1984), which accounts for the ordinal nature of our 
dependent variables and relaxes the proportional odds assumption.
5
 Prior to estimating our 
SLR model, we tested the distinguishability of our dependent variables’ categories, finding 
that all categories of each of our four outcome variables are statistically distinguishable from 
each other.
6
 In predicting, as in our case, three ordered outcome categories of different aspects 
of perceived social cohesion, we assume only one linear function to describe the relationship. 
Hence we utilise an onedimensional SLR model. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 displays results from the estimations using perceived tensions associated with 
wealth, social class, age and ethnicity as dependent variables. The differences in the 
coefficients across logit equations are denoted as Φ (Phi). θ (Theta) stands for the difference 
in intercepts of the different equations. We report standard errors in parenthesis, and 
coefficients which can be interpreted like conventional logit coefficients. We can observe that 
self-reported economic strain has a negative and statistically significant effect on perceived 
social cohesions for all four models. As we assumed, the opposite holds true for trust in 
institutions. As regards the interaction between strain and trust, however, we can observe that 
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the interaction term does not turn significant for social class and age. For the remaining 
models (wealth and ethnicity), the coefficient for the interaction between strain and trust is 
statistically significant, and is in the expected direction. Critically, graphing the interaction 
effects shows that the two statistically significant interaction terms exhibit similar moderating 
effects to those obtained using the social cohesion index in our original OLS estimations 
(figures available on request). The non-significant findings for social class and age is 
suggestive of the possibility that Europeans experiencing economic hardship feel little 
confidence that their political institutions are able to address problematic relationships 
between the working and managerial classes, so as between different age groups. Further 
quantitative and qualitative research exploring this possibility in more detail would cast 
valuable light on this important issue.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
To explore the potential for the quality of political institutions to mitigate the impact of 
economic difficulties on the cohesiveness of European societies, this paper has presented a 
statistical analysis of the separate and interactive effects of economic strain and institutional 
trust on Europeans’ perceptions of tensions between different social groups within their 
countries. The statistical results suggest that perceptions of social cohesion were negatively 
associated with economic strain, even when controlling for other relevant personal 
characteristics and circumstances. By contrast, individuals who trust the political institutions 
within their country have a much more positive view of the cohesiveness of society. Although 
individuals having difficulty making ends meet had a negative perception of social cohesion, 
if those people simultaneously had greater trust in their political institutions they appeared to 
perceive the tensions between different social groups within their country to be much less 
serious. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications. 
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Our study builds on existing theoretical and empirical work on social cohesion, 
providing a direct test of the connection between economic strain, institutional trust and inter-
group tensions. Although prior studies have explored variations in the Europeans’ perceptions 
of social tensions within their own country, that research has tended to seek explanations 
based on clusters of national welfare regimes (e.g. Green, Janmaat and Cheng, 2011), rather 
than individuals’ own attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, until now, the combined effects of 
strain and trust on social tensions have not been investigated within the same study. What 
emerges from our analysis of the Eurobarometer 74.1 data is a pattern of societal cohesiveness 
within European countries, which reflects the main theoretical perspectives from which we 
draw inspiration. That economic hardship increases the prospects of social tension is a key 
tenet of both social disorganization theory and reference group theory. That trustworthy 
political institutions bring with them positive social attitudes is at the heart of civic-republican 
political theories. That such institutions can also mitigate some of the damaging effects of 
economic sources of social tension is a valuable extension and synthesis of these different 
perspectives. 
The results of our analysis also provide food for thought for policy-makers about the 
kinds of substantive interventions, which might sustain perceptions of social cohesion in the 
wake of the financial crisis. Numerous scholars have drawn attention to the benefits of 
trustworthy political institutions for social cohesion, and it would seem that efforts to uphold 
institutional trust may be especially beneficial when citizens confront economic hardship. 
Indeed, building confidence in public institutions and encouraging processes of social 
innovation that elicit the positive contributions of citizens to public policy development is 
now a key goal for EU policy-makers seeking to uncover new sources of social cohesion 
(Hubert, 2010). These benefits are illustrated here by theorizing and empirically exploring the 
role that institutional trust may play in making European societies more resilient to the 
problems caused by economic strain. At the same time, it does seem as if that resilience 
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matters more for the relations between some social groups than others. In particular, labour 
relations and inter-generational relations appear to be less tractable in this regard than either 
ethnic or wealth-based relations. This is perhaps symptomatic of the current crises facing 
Europe, with the perceived disparity between the lot of the managerial and working classes 
and the disjoint between a young population desperately seeking work and the “baby 
boomers” enjoying a comfortable retirement posing profound challenges to the future viability 
of the European social model.  
The findings presented here nonetheless raise several important questions that are 
worthy of further analysis. Firstly, the statistical results we present are drawn from a cross-
sectional snapshot and so should be treated as evidence of statistical association rather than 
causation. It is therefore important to identify whether the relationships identified here are 
replicated when using research designs that are able to disentangle cause and effect more 
effectively than our data allow. Longitudinal quantitative and qualitative research which 
tracks how changes in economic strain and institutional trust influence (and are influenced by) 
the tensions between different social groups through time would also reveal more about the 
complex causal mechanisms underlying individuals’ experience of the economic and political 
opportunity structures and their attitudes towards other social groups. At the same time, it 
would be useful to supplement longitudinal analysis of survey data with research utilizing 
objective “archival” country-level measures of cohesion and economic performance.
7
 A 
research agenda that sought to address each of these issues would thus cast considerable light 
on the nature of social cohesion within and across EU member states. 
The results of our analysis indicate that institutional trust has an especially large 
statistically significant effect on perceptions of social cohesion in Europe. They also highlight 
that such trust can moderate negative externalities for social cohesion associated with 
economic hardship. Ultimately, this implies that more should be done to understand and 
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support the work that governments can undertake to build confidence in the policies that they 
develop and implement.  
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Notes 
1. With the exception of Cyprus (504), Luxembourg (476) and Malta (500), and also 
Germany (1,577) and the United Kingdom (1,309). 
2. Model fit was assessed using: Chi-square, root mean square error of approximation, 
comparative fit index, and Tucker-Lewis index (see Kline, 2011) – available upon request. 
3. The findings from the empirical analysis are not distorted by multicollinearity which can 
by exemplified by a Variance Inflation Factor of 2.1 with no single variable exceeding 7.0 
(Belsley, Kuh & Welsch 1980). 
4. Our findings are robust to different model specifications. Since Scandinavian countries are 
noted for having high levels of institutional trust (e.g. Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005), we 
were keen to eliminate the potential for the results to simply be biased by this regional 
effect and so re-ran our estimations excluding responses from Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden. In addition, we estimated random slope multilevel models with and without 
respondents from countries with particularly high Cook’s D values at the country level 
(Spain, Bulgaria, Sweden, Slovenia and Romania). In each case, the results for our 
substantive variables (i.e. economic strain, institutional trust and strain x trust) remain 
essentially the same. 
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5. An alternative estimation strategy would be to use a generalized OLR. However, this 
method produced negative predicted probabilities, making our results implausible (see 
Fullerton and Wallace, 2006). Multinomial logistic regression does not account for the 
ordered nature of our dependent variables, resulting in a potential loss of efficiency. 
Furthermore, we found a statistically significant better fit for our SLR models, than 
conventional multinomial methods. 
6. More precisely, we constrained two out of each of the three outcome categories to be 
equal, and then performed likelihood ratio tests by comparing the model fit between these 
models and the non-constrained ones for all possible combinations (available upon 
request). 
7. Inclusion of objective indicators (e.g. relative poverty rates, percentage of pensioners in 
the population, percentage of foreign-born population, percentage of workers involved in 
strikes (cohesion); unemployment rate and GDP per capita (economic performance)) 
within the cross-sectional statistical models we present here made little difference to the 
results that we observe. Nevertheless, it is possible that the long-term trajectory of these 
variables would tell one much about the cohesiveness of European societies. 
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Table 1.  Social cohesion across European countries 
% indicating 'a lot of 
tension' 
Poor and 
rich 
Management 
and workers 
Elderly and 
young 
Racial/ethni
c tensions 
Belgium 25.6 26.5 14.1 48.5 
Denmark 6.0 2.9 3.7 48.0 
Germany 40.8 40.4 18.1 44.9 
Greece 41.7 45.7 15.7 44.7 
Spain 28.2 35.5 15.8 39.8 
Finland 16.8 13.8 5.7 40.8 
France 46.4 45.3 16.7 55.3 
Ireland 22.4 21.1 5.9 30.6 
Italy 27.5 31.1 16.7 45.8 
Luxembourg 27.5 31.7 14.2 31.1 
Netherlands 15.8 18.8 11.1 55.1 
Austria 20.1 23.3 12.5 37.7 
Portugal 15.9 20.6 5.7 18.4 
Sweden 16.0 12.3 7.5 40.7 
UK 25.9 20.0 18.4 44.8 
Cyprus 13.3 13.5 7.5 30.1 
Czech Republic 51.2 38.8 22.5 60.3 
Estonia 32.7 26.9 17.6 22.2 
Hungary 74.0 58.4 26.3 64.8 
Latvia 41.0 22.1 11.3 15.9 
Lithuania 51.5 35.9 16.4 14.3 
Malta 27.7 28.0 15.7 54.1 
Poland 36.7 32.9 20.3 23.3 
Slovakia 40.6 34.8 13.9 40.1 
Slovenia 41.2 55.3 23.4 30.6 
Bulgaria 22.1 14.5 10.7 15.7 
Romania 39.7 43.3 21.0 22.6 
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Table 2. Dependent variables 
  Mean  SD Min, Max N 
Factor 
loading 
Social cohesion factor score 3.76e-09 1 -1.882, 2.367 22,748  
Poor and rich 1.830 0.667 1, 3 23,923 0.826 
Management and workers 1.817 0.619 1, 3 23,641 0.824 
Elderly and young people 2.162 0.652 1, 3 24,043 0.773 
Different racial/ ethnic groups 1.736 0.657 1, 3 23,743 0.660 
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Table 3. Independent variables (N=22,748) 
  Mean  SD Min, Max 
Economic strain 3.285 1.293 1, 6 
Institutional trust 4.117 2.329 1, 10 
Wealth status 5.453 1.614 1, 10 
Employment category  
Managers & Professionals 0.098 0.298 0, 1 
Clerical staff 0.184 0.387 0, 1 
Self-employed 0.070 0.255 0, 1 
Working class 0.134 0.341 0, 1 
Unemployed 0.085 0.279 0, 1 
Not in labor force 0.429 0.495 0, 1 
Age  
 15-24 years 0.119 0.324 0, 1 
 25-39 years 0.242 0.428 0, 1 
 40-54 years 0.266 0.442 0, 1 
 55+ years 0.374 0.484 0, 1 
Immigrant 0.023 0.151 0, 1 
Female 0.462 0.499 0, 1 
Type of community  
 Rural town 0.357 0.479 0, 1 
 Small or medium town 0.358 0.480 0, 1 
 Large town 0.285 0.451 0, 1 
Education  
 Basic 0.193 0.395 0, 1 
 Secondary 0.473 0.500 0, 1 
 Higher 0.334 0.472 0, 1 
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Table 4. Economic strain, institutional trust and social cohesion (OLS) 
  
Model 1 
Baseline 
Model 2 
+ Strain 
Model 3 
+ Trust 
Model 4 
+ Interaction 
Economic strain 
  
-0.072**  
(0.010) 
-0.054**  
(0.010) 
-0.051**  
(0.010) 
Institutional trust 
    
0.077** 
(0.005) 
0.078** 
(0.005) 
Strain X trust 
      
0.011** 
(0.004) 
Wealth status 
0.0512**  
(0.007) 
0.023** 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Immigrant (Ref. non-immigrant) 
0.205** 
(0.079) 
0.217** 
(0.078) 
0.150* 
(0.076) 
0.146+ 
(0.076) 
Employment category (Ref. managers & professionals) 
Clerical workers 
-0.105** 
(0.036) 
-0.098** 
(0.036) 
-0.085* 
(0.036) 
-0.091* 
(0.036) 
Self-employed 
-0.093* 
(0.046) 
-0.090+ 
(0.046) 
-0.078+ 
(0.046) 
-0.081+ 
(0.046) 
Working class 
-0.107* 
(0.042) 
-0.091* 
(0.042) 
-0.059 
(0.041) 
-0.065 
(0.041) 
Unemployed 
-0.218** 
(0.048) 
-0.181** 
(0.049) 
-0.150** 
(0.048) 
-0.150** 
(0.048) 
Not in Labour force 
-0.093* 
(0.038) 
-0.083* 
(0.038) 
-0.076* 
(0.037) 
-0.081* 
(0.037) 
Gender (Ref. Male) 
0.059** 
(0.020) 
0.056** 
(0.020) 
0.057** 
(0.020) 
0.058** 
(0.020) 
Age (Ref. 15-24 years) 
        
25-39 years 
0.063+ 
(0.035) 
0.071* 
(0.035) 
0.076* 
(0.035) 
0.078* 
(0.035) 
40-54 years 
0.031 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.035) 
0.038 
(0.034) 
0.040 
(0.034) 
55+ years 
0.151** 
(0.033) 
0.135** 
(0.033) 
0.128** 
(0.032) 
0.131** 
(0.032) 
Type of community (Ref. rural town) 
Small or medium town 
0.001 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.0230) 
Large town 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.000 
(0.025) 
Education (Ref. higher)         
Basic 
-0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.032) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
Secondary 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
Intercept 
-0.332** 
(0.075) 
-0.191* 
(0.078) 
-0.138+ 
(0.077) 
-0.122 
(0.077) 
R² 0.080 0.085 0.110 0.111 
Adj. R² 0.078 0.083 0.108 0.109 
F-statistic 69.87** 70.04** 76.75** 75.16** 
N 22,748 
Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects not 
shown. 
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Table 5. Strain, trust and the different aspects of social cohesion (SLR) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Wealth Social class Age Ethnicity 
          
Economic strain -0.165**  (0.035) -0.122**  (0.034) -0.060*  (0.030) -0.136**  (0.036) 
Institutional trust 0.195**  (0.016) 0.226**  (0.018) 0.089**  (0.020) 0.202**  (0.017) 
Strain X trust 0.034**  (0.012) 0.015  (0.012) 0.018+  (0.010) 0.030**  (0.012) 
          
Wealth status 0.022  (0.027) 0.045+  (0.026) 0.046+  (0.024) -0.070*  (0.028) 
Immigrant (Ref. non-immigrant) 0.277  (0.239) 0.394+  (0.226) 0.143  (0.199) 0.607**  (0.229) 
Employment category (Ref. managers & professionals)     
Clerical workers -0.314*  (0.127) -0.125  (0.126) -0.257*  (0.115) -0.029  (0.133) 
Self-employed -0.294+  (0.155) -0.040  (0.155) -0.197  (0.144) -0.049  (0.162) 
Working class -0.180  (0.140) -0.084  (0.140) -0.159  (0.138) -0.162  (0.149) 
Unemployed -0.523**  (0.159) -0.348*  (0.159) -0.309+  (0.161) 0.049  (0.170) 
Not in Labour force -0.283*  (0.127) -0.109  (0.128) -0.252*  (0.121) -0.148  (0.134) 
Gender (Ref. Male) 0.172**  (0.064) 0.062  (0.064) 0.124*  (0.060) 0.168*  (0.067) 
Age (Ref. 15-24 years)  
25-39 years 0.398**  (0.119) 0.166  (0.117) -0.029  (0.112) 0.007  (0.126) 
40-54 years 0.396**  (0.117) -0.053  (0.115) -0.171  (0.110) -0.049  (0.126) 
55+ years 0.606**  (0.113) 0.207+  (0.108) 0.019  (0.104) 0.207+  (0.119) 
Type of community (Ref. rural town)  
Small or medium town  0.047  (0.075) -0.010  (0.074) -0.007  (0.068) -0.028  (0.081) 
Large town  0.001  (0.080) 0.153+  (0.082) -0.069  (0.074) -0.054  (0.087) 
Education (Ref. higher)         
Basic  -0.137  (0.101) 0.262*  (0.107) -0.084  (0.099) 0.118  (0.111) 
Secondary  -0.118  (0.078) 0.188*  (0.078) 0.018  (0.070) -0.051  (0.082) 
          
Φ 1 1 1 1 1 
Φ 2  0.403**  (0.035) 0.336**  (0.038) 0.714**  (0.075) 0.463**  (0.024) 
Φ 3 (Base) 0 0 0 0 
          
θ 1  0.812**  (0.258) 1.285**  (0.263) -0.460*  (0.228) 1.785**  (0.275) 
θ 2  1.425**  (0.109) 1.878**  (0.098) 0.759**  (0.163) 1.893**  (0.134) 
θ 3 (Base) 0 0 0 0 
          
Wald chi (df) 1,758** (44) 1,631** (44) 786.4** (44) 1,656** (44) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -21,735 -20,287 -22,671 -20,813 
N 23,923 23,641 24,043 23,743 
Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed 
effects are not presented. 
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Figure 1. Predicted values of social cohesion for institutional trust and economic strain 
(95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 2. Marginal effects of economic strain on social cohesion contingent on 
institutional trust (95% confidence intervals)  
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